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I. INTRODUCTION 
Be aware—if you are a resident of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, or 
Tennessee, the police can now obtain a record of your physical location without 
a court-issued warrant.1 For cell phone owners in these states—which is nearly 
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 1 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 886–90 (6th Cir. 2016).  
14 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
everyone2—the Sixth Circuit has determined that the Fourth Amendment does 
not protect your geographic cell site location information (CSLI).3  
The Sixth Circuit joined a host of other circuits and dealt a blow to privacy 
rights when it decided United States v. Carpenter.4 In Carpenter, the court 
found that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in their CSLI.5 
CSLI is the geographic data that cell phone users generate and send to carriers 
during daily use of their cellular devices.6 Wireless carriers store CSLI, and law 
enforcement can request the information.7 This decision affects the privacy of 
millions of Americans who use their cell phones every day.  
The decision comes at a time when courts are struggling to keep the Fourth 
Amendment updated with changing technology.8 The Supreme Court has not 
helped with this endeavor—it has sidestepped several opportunities to help 
redefine the contours of the Fourth Amendment for a twenty-first century 
world.9 On September 26, 2016, Carpenter filed a petition for a writ of certiorari 
and presented the Supreme Court with yet another opportunity to modernize the 
Fourth Amendment.10 Hopefully the Supreme Court will not shy away from this 
moment.  
                                                                                                                 
 2 A recent report from the Pew Research Center shows that 95% of Americans now 
own some type of cell phone. See Mobile Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/ [https://perma.cc/PGC3-67EZ]. 
Remarkably, 77% of Americans own a smartphone. Id. 
 3 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886–90.  
 4 The Sixth Circuit’s decision reached the same conclusion as the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 500 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 
479 (2015); United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2014) (following their 
own precedent established in In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 
2013)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1548 (2015). Further, after Carpenter, the Fourth Circuit, in 
an en banc decision, reached the same conclusion on Fourth Amendment treatment of CSLI. 
See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 5 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888. 
 6 Robinson Meyer, Do Police Need a Warrant to See Where a Phone Is?, ATLANTIC 
(Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/08/warrantless-cell-
phone-location-tracking/400775/ [https://perma.cc/9C53-TSHC]; see also Carpenter, 819 
F.3d at 885. 
 7 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885. 
 8 See Ric Simmons, The Missed Opportunities of Riley v. California, 12 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 253, 253 (2014). 
 9 For example, Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014), United States v. Jones, 565 
U.S. 400 (2012), and City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010), are all recent cases where 
the Supreme Court has either avoided a Fourth Amendment question or limited their holding 
to the specifics of the case before them. See Aaron Stevenson, A Fourth Amendment 
Framework for the Future: Applying the Mosaic Theory to Digital Communications, 77 
OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 145, 150 & n.32 (2016). For an argument that the Supreme 
Court has been too hesitant to update the Fourth Amendment with new technology, see 
generally Simmons, supra note 8. 
 10 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (Sept. 26, 
2016); Carpenter v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/c 
ases/carpenter-v-united-states-2/ [https://perma.cc/8T9H-Q7MV].  
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This Comment examines the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in Carpenter 
and analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s decision within the context of similar court 
decisions. Part II looks at the facts of the Carpenter case, the court’s opinion, 
the law on which it rests, and similar circuit court decisions. Part III considers 
the effects of the decision, unanswered questions that remain, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opportunity to review the case.  
II. THE CASE ITSELF—A LOOK AT UNITED STATES V. CARPENTER AND 
SIMILAR DECISIONS 
Before analyzing the effects of the Carpenter decision and looking towards 
future events, this Comment first examines the case itself and the rationale 
behind the decision.  
A. The Facts of the Case 
Between December 2010 and March 2011, a string of robberies took place 
at Radio Shack and T-Mobile stores in and around Detroit, Michigan.11 In April 
of 2011, police arrested four individuals whom they believed were involved 
with the robberies.12 One man confessed to the crimes.13 During his confession, 
he described a team of other individuals who were involved in the criminal 
activities.14 This man also gave the FBI his phone and provided the FBI with 
the phone numbers of individuals he claimed were involved in the robberies.15  
Equipped with this information, the FBI filed three applications with 
magistrate judges in an effort to procure the “transactional records” of up to 
sixteen different phone numbers from their wireless carriers.16 The most 
important information that the FBI requested was “cell site [location] 
information for the target telephones at call origination and at call termination 
for incoming and outgoing calls[.]”17 The magistrate judges granted these 
applications under the Stored Communications Act (SCA).18 After the FBI 
obtained this information, Carpenter (and others) were accused of, and charged 
with, violating the Hobbs Act, among other things.19 
                                                                                                                 
 11 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.  
 12 Id.  
 13 Id.  
 14 Id.  
 15 Id.  
 16 Id.  
 17 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884 (second alteration in original) (quoting the FBI’s 
application). 
 18 Id. The relevant section of the Stored Communications Act (SCA) is found in 18 
U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2012). The SCA is discussed infra Part II.B.  
 19 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884. The Hobbs Act is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The Hobbs 
Act outlaws any activity that is considered robbery or extortion that interferes with 
commerce. See United States v. Taylor, 754 F.3d 217, 222 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 
2074 (2016). 
16 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
Before the trial, the defendants attempted to exclude the CSLI evidence.20 
They argued that the government collection of the CSLI evidence was a 
violation of their Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.21 They claimed that because the search was not supported by a warrant 
issued with probable cause, the collection of the records was inappropriate.22 
The district court denied the motion, and the case continued to trial.23  
At trial, individuals involved in the robberies testified about the strategy 
used to carry out the crimes.24 Then, an FBI agent testified about the CSLI the 
FBI obtained.25  
The agent explained that CSLI is generated when cell phones connect with 
radio towers to perform certain tasks—such as placing a call.26 The cell towers 
have receptors that project radio signals in certain directions, and the phone 
connects with a certain signal receptor on each tower.27 By knowing which 
tower and which specific signal receptor a cell phone connects with, a third party 
can discover the area in which the cell phone is located.28 The specificity of this 
location information largely depends on the density of the towers—the more 
towers around the cell phone, the more towers a cell phone can connect with, 
and, therefore, the location of the phone is more precise.29 The phone company 
then stores this information for internal use.30  
Armed with the defendants’ CSLI, the FBI created maps showing the 
location of the defendants’ cell phones at certain time periods.31 These maps 
revealed that the defendants were within half a mile to two miles of the robbery 
locations at roughly the same time the robberies occurred.32 
After being presented with this information, the jury convicted Carpenter 
on the Hobbs Act charges, among others.33 The court sentenced Carpenter to 
                                                                                                                 
 20 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884.  
 21 See id. 
 22 Id.  
 23 Id.  
 24 Id.  
 25 Id. at 885. 
 26 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. For example, if I use my cell phone while driving down the highway, my cell 
phone will connect to Tower A, the closest tower to my cell phone. Assume the highway is 
south of Tower A. My cell phone will connect to the signal receptor that faces south. Thus, 
a third party knowing that I was connected to Tower A using the south receptor knows the 
area where I was when I used my cell phone. See id. If, as I drive down the highway, I get 
closer to Tower B, my phone will connect to Tower B. If I connect with the north signal 
receptor on Tower B, the third party now knows the area where my cell phone is located 
(close and north to Tower B). See id. With these two data points put together, a third party 
can also tell the direction in which I am driving.  
 29 See id.  
 30 Id.  
 31 Id.  
 32 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885.  
 33 Id. 
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1,395 months of imprisonment, and he and another defendant appealed their 
convictions and sentences to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.34 
B. The Court’s Decision and the Legal Ground on Which It Stands 
In an opinion written by Judge Kethledge, the Sixth Circuit found that the 
collection of the CSLI without a probable cause warrant was not a violation of 
the defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights.35 The decision is important because 
it further extends the address/content distinction to a technology driven world.  
Traditionally, the Fourth Amendment has been a physical, property based 
right.36 However, ever since Katz v. United States, the Fourth Amendment 
framework has focused on the privacy of people, not places and property.37 
After Katz, the pertinent question for a Fourth Amendment analysis is: did the 
government action violate the defendant’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”38 
Due to the ambiguous nature of an individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy, courts have developed benchmarks to help determine when an 
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.39 As the Sixth Circuit points 
out, one such benchmark is the address/content distinction.40 
The address/content distinction helps identify privacy protection based on 
the type of information that the government recovers.41 Address information is 
information that must be provided to a third party intermediary to complete 
                                                                                                                 
 34 Id.  
 35 Id. at 890. It should be noted that Congress created a statutory scheme to deal with 
the recovery of certain electronic information held by companies: the SCA. See 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2701–2711 (2012). This statute allows a government actor to obtain electronic records 
with a “less-than-a-warrant standard.” Orin Kerr, 6th Circuit: No Fourth Amendment Rights 
in Cell-Site Records, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 13, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/04/13/6th-circuit-no-
fourth-amendment-rights-in-cell-site-records/?utm_term=.ab29ec342e52 [https://perma.cc/ 
87K4-EY2L]. In this case, the FBI complied with the statutory scheme. See Carpenter, 819 
F.3d at 884. The specific challenge in Carpenter is that the Fourth Amendment applies to 
CSLI, and, therefore, the “less-than-a-warrant standard” does not clear the constitutional 
rigor of the Fourth Amendment. Kerr, supra; accord Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 884–85. The 
defendants claim the additional protection of the Fourth Amendment should apply to CSLI, 
and thus, the standard to retrieve CSLI should be a Fourth Amendment standard and not a 
Stored Communications Act standard. See id. The implications of this distinction are 
significant. Perhaps most importantly, the exclusionary rule does not apply to violations of 
the SCA. See United States v. Guerrero, 768 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 
S. Ct. 1548 (2015). 
 36 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886. 
 37 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”); see also Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886.  
 38 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 39 See, e.g., United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 509–11 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 40 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886.  
 41 See id.; see also Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11. 
18 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
communication.42 Content information is the actual substance of the message.43 
The Sixth Circuit traces this distinction back to an 1878 case, Ex Parte 
Jackson.44  
In Ex Parte Jackson, the Supreme Court found that the Fourth Amendment 
protects letters and packages from unreasonable government searches and 
seizures.45 However, the Court also found that the outside of letters and 
packages are not constitutionally protected.46 The distinction is this: One type 
of information is addressing information that the sender knows must be seen by 
a third party intermediary.47 The other type of information is content 
information that the sender does not expect the third party intermediary to see.48 
This distinction has remained over time and been applied to new technologies. 
The Sixth Circuit then explains the progression of the address/content 
distinction and discusses instances when courts have applied it to new 
technologies. Prominently, the court points out that Katz itself is about address 
and content information.49 In Katz, the Supreme Court held that the government 
could not eavesdrop on the content of a conversation because the conversation 
was constitutionally protected.50 However, only twelve years later, the Supreme 
Court found that the numbers dialed by a phone user were not constitutionally 
protected.51 The distinction is that the caller must have known that a third party 
(the phone company) sees the numbers to connect the call.52 However, the caller 
does not expect that the substance of the call is recorded or heard.53  
The Sixth Circuit then discusses the application of the address/content 
distinction in the digital age.54 The court refers to its own decision in United 
States v. Warshak.55 In Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that the content of an 
email is protected, even though the sender exposes the message to a third 
                                                                                                                 
 42 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886; see also Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11.  
 43 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886; see also Forrester, 512 F.3d at 509–11. 
 44 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886 (discussing Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S 727 (1878)).  
 45 Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886; see also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
 48 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886; see also Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733. 
 49 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886–87 (discussing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 
(1967)).  
 50 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 51 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (discussed in Carpenter, 819 F.3d 
at 887). 
 52 See id. at 742 (“[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of 
privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone 
numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching 
equipment that their calls are completed.”). 
 53 Id. at 743.  
 54 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887. For an argument of why the address/content distinction 
has been misapplied in, and is not fit for, the digital age, see Stevenson, supra note 9, at 157–
61.  
 55 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887 (discussing United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th 
Cir. 2010)).  
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party.56 The court reached this conclusion because it sees the email as the 
modern day letter,57 and if the contents of a letter are protected, then the contents 
of an email should also be protected.  
The Carpenter court follows the logical progression of address/content 
jurisprudence and applies the same analysis to a new technology: CSLI.58 Thus, 
the court analyzed CSLI using the address/content distinction.59 
It seems clear to the court that CSLI is simply “address” information needed 
to complete a phone call.60 When a phone user wants to place a call, companies 
use CSLI to facilitate the connection of the call through the wireless carrier. The 
court believes CSLI is similar to the address information in Ex Parte Jackson or 
the phone numbers obtained in Smith.61 On each of these occasions, the 
recovered information simply facilitates the communication, as opposed to 
being the substance of the communication. Thus, CSLI is simply address 
information, which courts have continually held lacks constitutional protection.  
The court concludes its argument by asserting that CSLI is voluntarily 
conveyed to the phone companies.62 Phone users surely must understand that 
when they place a call they “expose” their location to the nearest cell phone 
tower.63 Further, as the court points out, users must understand that wireless 
carriers record this information because roaming charges are placed on accounts 
when the user is out of network.64 This undercuts the argument that cell phone 
                                                                                                                 
 56 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288. Although, unlike regular mail and phone calls, the content 
of an email is exposed to a third party. It can be argued that Warshak should not have applied 
the address/content distinction as it conflicts with the third party doctrine. Thus, even though 
the substance of an email is content, it should not receive Fourth Amendment protection. See 
Stevenson, supra note 9, at 159–60.  
 57 Id. at 285–86. However, some believe that email is more closely analogous to sending 
a postcard through the mail because, unlike a letter in an envelope, sending an email allows 
the third party intermediary to see the contents of the message, like a postcard. See NANCY 
FLYNN & RANDOLPH KAHN, E-MAIL RULES 173 (2003) (“The common analogy is that 
standard e-mail is like sending a ‘postcard written in pencil through the postal mail.’ A 
postcard, because anyone who sees the message along the way can freely read it . . . .”). 
 58 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 887–88. Carpenter may be critiqued for the fact that some 
believe we should not be using the same thought processes to analyze Fourth Amendment 
challenges in the digital age. See, e.g., id. at 894 (Stranch, J., concurring in part) (“The 
addition of cellular (not to mention internet) communication has left courts struggling to 
determine if (and how) existing tests apply or whether new tests should be framed. I am 
inclined to favor the latter approach for several reasons . . . .”). 
 59 Id. at 887–88 (majority opinion) (“Thus, for the same reasons that Smith had no 
expectation of privacy in the numerical information at issue there, the defendants have no 
such expectation in the locational information here. On this point, Smith is binding 
precedent.”). 
 60 Id. (“[T]he defendants’ cellphones signaled the nearest cell towers . . . solely ‘as a 
means of establishing communication.’” (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 
(1979))). 
 61 See supra notes 47–48, 52 and accompanying text.  
 62 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 888. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id.  
20 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
users are not voluntarily transferring their information to the phone companies 
when using a cell phone.65 
C. Comparing the Decision to Other CSLI Cases 
The Carpenter decision may become known not for its novelty, but for its 
uniformity. The decision helps grow a consensus of courts deciding that there is 
no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI. When the Sixth Circuit issued its 
opinion, it joined the Fifth66 and Eleventh67 Circuits in not protecting CSLI. 
Shortly thereafter, the Fourth Circuit68 joined this group.69  
These circuits all analyzed CSLI under the same framework. They all 
treated CSLI as business records that are subject to the address/content 
distinction.70 Further, all the circuits have compared CSLI to the phone numbers 
an individual dials when placing a phone call, thus heavily relying on the 
precedent in Smith.71 This simple, consistent analysis is almost as important as 
                                                                                                                 
 65 The argument that cell phone users do not voluntarily provide their information in 
today’s technological world has been rejected in other circuits. See United States v. Graham, 
824 F.3d 421, 429–30 (4th Cir. 2016) (addressing and rejecting the defendant’s argument 
that they did not voluntarily provide their CSLI to phone providers). But see United States 
v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 356 (4th Cir. 2015) (“Cell phone and text message 
communications are so pervasive that some persons may consider them to be essential means 
or necessary instruments for self-expression, even self-identification.” (quoting City of 
Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010))), adhered to in part en banc, 824 F.3d 421. 
 66 See In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 67 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 
(2015). 
 68 See Graham, 824 F.3d 421. 
 69 Interestingly, while the circuits have thus far agreed amongst each other with the 
treatment of CSLI, one circuit internally disagreed with the treatment of CSLI. The Fourth 
Circuit originally decided that CSLI was constitutionally protected, Graham, 796 F.3d at 
349, but that decision was later overturned on an en banc appeal, Graham, 824 F.3d 421. In 
its original decision, the Fourth Circuit panel majority was concerned with how much 
information can be aggregated when the government collects CSLI. Graham, 796 F.3d at 
357 (“[S]ociety recognizes an individual’s privacy interest in her movements over an 
extended time period . . . .”). This issue is addressed infra Part III.B.  
 70 Graham, 824 F.3d at 433 (“The Supreme Court has thus forged a clear distinction 
between the contents of communications and the non-content information that enables 
communications providers to transmit the content. CSLI, which identifies the equipment 
used to route calls and texts, undeniably belongs in the non-content category.” (footnote 
omitted)); Davis, 785 F.3d at 515 (“Because Davis has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the type of non-content data collected in MetroPCS’s historical cell tower records, neither 
one day nor 67 days of such records, produced by court order, violate the Fourth 
Amendment.”); Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 612 (“[T]he historical cell site 
information reveals his location information for addressing purposes, not the contents of his 
calls.”).  
 71 See Graham, 824 F.3d at 427; Davis, 785 F.3d at 512; Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d at 612; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979).  
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the holding itself, for courts could analyze the collection of CSLI information 
using different methods. 
No circuit has analyzed the collection of CSLI as a location tracking case. 
Generally, a different analysis applies when the government actively collects 
tracking information—such as from the monitoring of movements from a 
GPS—as opposed to retrieving business records.72 This distinction is important, 
as it could lead to a different result.  
When the government collects CSLI, it is obtaining snapshots of an 
individual’s location. Many of these snapshots together can create an overview 
of an individual’s movements over time. Thus, it is reasonable to think of CSLI 
as a location tracking case.73  
However, every circuit has distinguished CSLI from a location tracking case 
because cell phone users volunteer their CSLI to a third party for business 
records as opposed to a location tracking case where the government usually is 
actively tracking an individual with GPS systems.74 In other words—tracking is 
an unwanted government intrusion; CSLI recovery is the government collection 
of third party records provided by an individual. Therefore, all of the circuits 
analyze CSLI through a business records analysis instead of a location tracking 
analysis.  
However, the Sixth Circuit also focused on another difference between 
location tracking and business records: the precision of GPS compared to CSLI.  
                                                                                                                 
 72 In his opinion in Carpenter, Judge Stranch illustrated this distinction when discussing 
the difficulty in devising a Fourth Amendment test: 
This difficulty is exemplified by the two conceptual categories under the Fourth 
Amendment found in this case and the law that governs each. The majority accurately 
describes two different strains of law, one addressing the distinction between GPS 
tracking and the less accurate CSLI obtained and used in this case and the other 
“between the content of a communication and the information necessary to convey it.” 
United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 894 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., concurring in part) 
(quoting id. at 883 (majority opinion)). 
 73 Id. at 895 (“[I]t seems to me that the business records test is ill suited to address the 
issues regarding personal location that are before us. I therefore return to the law governing 
location.”). 
 74 Id. at 889 (majority opinion) (referring to secret GPS tracking by the government, 
the court noted “[t]hat sort of government intrusion presents one set of Fourth Amendment 
questions; government collection of business records presents another”); Graham 824 F.3d 
at 426 (“No government tracking is at issue here. Rather, the question before us is whether 
the government invades an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy when it obtains, 
from a third party, the third party’s records, which permit the government to deduce location 
information.”); Davis, 785 F.3d at 513–15 (distinguishing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 
400 (2012), a GPS tracking case, from the CSLI case that was before the court); Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 610 (“[T]he Government, when determining whether an intrusion 
constitutes a search or seizure, draws a line based on whether it is the Government collecting 
the information . . . or whether it is a third party, of its own accord and for its own purposes, 
recording the information.”). 
22 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
CSLI, the Sixth Circuit contends, provides much more general information 
about an individual’s location compared to GPS.75 GPS can locate an individual 
accurately within fifty feet, whereas CSLI can only “locate” an individual within 
an area as large as 3.5 million to 100 million square feet.76 Because the area of 
CSLI is much broader, the court argues that CSLI is much less invasive than 
GPS.77 Many shops, offices, and restaurants fall within the CSLI range, whereas 
GPS reveals specific shops, offices, and restaurants.78 This specificity, the court 
argues, is a major reason to separate a GPS tracking case from a business records 
case like CSLI.79 
The Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourth Circuits placed less emphasis on the 
precision of CSLI as compared to GPS.80 Rather, the thrust of each circuit’s 
Fourth Amendment analysis focused on individuals voluntarily providing their 
CSLI to third parties.81  
The common emphasis among circuits is that the government does not 
actively track an individual to obtain their CSLI. Rather, the government simply 
obtained location information from a third party who held the records.82 This 
uniform reasoning represents a growing consensus among the circuits on how 
to treat CSLI. However, this is something to watch in the future, as a location 
based CSLI framework could lead to a much different result.  
III. EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF THE DECISION MOVING FORWARD 
Understanding the growing consensus of circuit court decisions, we can 
now look to the future and examine the implications.  
A. The Decision’s Effects on Daily Privacy 
The obvious implication stemming from Carpenter is that CSLI for 
individuals within the Sixth Circuit is not protected under the Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 75 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889. 
 76 Id. The court notes that this is roughly 12,500 times less accurate than GPS data. Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. The court points out that this large of an area could include “bridal stores and 
Bass Pro Shops, gay bars and straight ones, a Methodist church and the local mosque.” Id.  
 79 See id. at 889–90. The decision of the Sixth Circuit to focus on this specificity is 
curious. See infra Part III.B. 
 80 While these circuits did comment on the less precise nature of CSLI as compared to 
GPS, this was not a central component of their Fourth Amendment analysis. See generally 
United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); United States v. Davis, 
785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015); In re U.S. for Historical Cell 
Site Data, 724 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 81 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.  
 82 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. Carpenter did not ignore this reality. 
Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889. The underlying idea of the address/content distinction is that the 
address information is willingly provided to a third party.  
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Amendment. This means that every time an individual places a phone call, the 
government can retroactively discover the general location of the individual.83  
The Sixth Circuit decision applies to historical CSLI.84 This means that we 
do not know if the government can currently request an individual’s future 
CSLI. After Carpenter, the government can only request an individual’s prior 
CSLI, as opposed to requesting records for CSLI for the next six months. 
However, this does not limit the government from submitting a request every 
month, week, or even day for an individual’s CSLI.  
In fact, other than knowing the government can request historical CSLI, 
Carpenter’s implications on daily privacy are ambiguous at best. This is because 
the Sixth Circuit’s decision left many important, tangential CSLI questions 
unanswered. 
B. Unanswered Questions—What the Sixth Circuit Didn’t Say 
As Fourth Amendment doctrine develops with new technology, the 
questions that the Sixth Circuit left unanswered in Carpenter are extremely 
important to courts and individuals alike. Specifically, after Carpenter it is 
unknown how the Sixth Circuit will treat 1) non-phone call generated CSLI, 2) 
more precise CSLI, 3) third party GPS cases, and 4) mass amount of information 
cases. 
1. Non-Phone Call Generated CSLI 
In Carpenter, the FBI search applications specifically requested CSLI 
generated from a specific event: the defendants actively placing a call.85 
However, with advancements in cellular devices, phones now send text 
messages, use GPS for certain applications, and much more. Each event that 
generates CSLI creates another specific event that the government can then 
request from a wireless carrier.86 Further, cellular devices are constantly 
emitting radio waves attempting to find the nearest cell tower, and thus, are 
constantly generating CSLI.87 
                                                                                                                 
 83 See Meyer, supra note 6.  
 84 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 889 (“Jones, in contrast, lands near the other end of the 
spectrum: there, government agents secretly attached a GPS device to the underside of 
Jones’s vehicle and then monitored his movements continuously for four weeks. That sort of 
government intrusion presents one set of Fourth Amendment questions; government 
collection of business records presents another.” (emphasis added)).  
 85 Id. at 884. 
 86 See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 542 (11th Cir.) (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]oday, the vast majority of communications from cell phones are in the form of text 
messages and data transfers, not phone calls.”), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 479 (2015). 
 87 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 885 (“[C]ellphones work by establishing a radio connection 
with nearby cell towers (or ‘cell sites’); . . . phones are constantly searching for the strongest 
signal from those towers . . . .”); Davis, 785 F.3d at 542 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“As a person 
walks around town, particularly a dense, urban environment, her cell phone continuously 
24 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
The Sixth Circuit, and the other circuits, all base their decisions on the 
business records and address/content distinctions.88 These doctrines are based 
on a user voluntarily exposing information to a third party intermediary.89 
However, at what point does voluntary disclosure cease to apply?90 
In the case of specific cellular events, such as a phone call or text message, 
we probably have our answer: never. The logical extension of Carpenter is that 
any time a specific attempt to communicate via cell phone occurs, the transfer 
of information is voluntary. However, what happens when there is no attempt at 
communication, and a user’s phone is simply sitting in a pocket or on a table?  
In today’s world, ownership of a cell phone is almost necessary. Cellular 
calls, text messages, email, mobile banking, directions, and much more are all 
features of a modern cell phone. It would be almost unthinkable to not have a 
cell phone in the digital world that we live in today.91  
Because cellular devices are constantly emitting radio waves to locate radio 
towers, CSLI is constantly generated.92 Does the act of carrying a cellular device 
constitute a voluntary conveyance of one’s location to a third party? Will the 
government be able to request records for CSLI when the phone is simply sitting 
idle in the user’s pocket?93 We do not know the answers to these questions, but 
if we extend the logic of Carpenter and other CSLI cases, the result does not 
look good for privacy.  
                                                                                                                 
and without notice to her connects with towers, antennas, microcells, and femto-cells that 
reveal her location information with differing levels of precision—to the nearest mile, or the 
nearest block, or the nearest foot. And since a text or phone call could come in at any 
second—without any affirmative act by a cell phone user—a user has no control over the 
extent of location information she reveals.”). 
 88 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.  
 89 In Smith (which the Sixth Circuit relies on heavily to emphasis the address/content 
distinction), the Court stated: “[P]etitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to 
the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary 
course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal 
to police the numbers he dialed.” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). 
 90 See, e.g., Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (“[M]odern cell 
phones . . . are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor 
from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”).  
 91 Davis, 785 F.3d at 539 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“Today, ‘it is the person who is not 
carrying a cell phone . . . who is the exception.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Riley, 134 
S. Ct. at 2490)). 
 92 See supra note 87; see also Davis, 785 F.3d at 542 (Martin, J., dissenting) 
(“‘[S]martphones . . . communicate even more frequently with the carrier’s network, because 
they typically check for new email messages or other data every few minutes.’ . . . Each of 
these new types of communications can generate cell site location data.” (quoting ACLU 
amicus brief)). In the Davis case, a dissenting opinion pointed out that the government 
obtained 11,606 CSLI data points over sixty-seven days. Id. at 533. If the court assumes the 
defendant slept for eight hours a day, this corresponds to one data point being generated 
every five and a half minutes. Id. at 540. 
 93 When a smartphone sits idly in a pocket, it can still generate CSLI by providing some 
smartphone services for the user, such as checking email. See supra note 92 and 
accompanying text.  
Vol. 78] OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL FURTHERMORE 25 
When an individual buys a phone and wants cellular service, a user signs a 
contract with a wireless company to use its network. Following the logic of the 
Sixth Circuit, this contract may be considered voluntary consent to provide the 
phone company with their location as long as they are connected to the wireless 
carrier’s network, even if not actively using their phone.94 That CSLI will 
become a “business record,” and thus lose all Fourth Amendment protection.  
2. More Precise CSLI Cases95 
Each circuit that has addressed CSLI has mentioned the relative generality 
of location information revealed by CSLI.96 The Sixth Circuit (for curious 
reasons) showed a particular interest in this generality compared to GPS location 
information.97 However, the generality of CSLI may soon be a relic of the past.  
The denser the cellular tower network, the more specific the CSLI will be.98 
With the number of cellular sites rapidly increasing (and showing no signs of 
slowing down), CSLI is certain to be much more precise in the future.99 If an 
important consideration for Fourth Amendment protection is truly the generality 
of CSLI, at what point does CSLI become more concerning to the courts? Is it 
when CSLI can pinpoint location within one mile? Five hundred feet? Ten feet? 
We do not hold the answer to this question. But again, if we follow the logic of 
Carpenter, these specifics will not matter.100  
                                                                                                                 
 94 See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (“A cell 
phone user voluntarily enters an arrangement with his service provider in which he knows 
that he must maintain proximity to the provider’s cell towers in order for his phone to 
function. Whenever he expects his phone to work, he is permitting—indeed, requesting—
his service provider to establish a connection between his phone and a nearby cell tower.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 95 It should be noted that the Sixth Circuit explicitly sidestepped this problem in their 
decision. The court decided not to address arguments regarding “femtocells” that can locate 
a phone within ten meters. United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 889 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(“[O]ur task is to decide this case, not hypothetical ones; and in this case there are no 
femtocells to be found.”).  
 96 See Graham, 824 F.3d at 447 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Davis, 785 F.3d at 515; In re U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
609 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 97 See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text. 
 98 Davis, 785 F.3d at 542 (Martin, J., dissenting) (“As new cell sites are erected, the 
coverage areas around existing nearby cell sites will be reduced . . . .” (quoting ACLU amicus 
brief)). This is why urban CSLI is more precise than rural CSLI. Id. at 503 (majority opinion) 
(“[T]he density of cell towers in an urban area like Miami would make the coverage of any 
given tower smaller.”).  
 99 The number of cell sites has almost doubled in the past decade, and phone companies 
are always attempting to upgrade their service by improving their networks with more cell 
towers. Id. at 541–42 (Martin, J., dissenting).  
 100 A dissenting judge in Graham alluded to this:  
[A] narrower holding would have allowed this Court to grapple, in the future, with the 
effect of rapidly changing phone technology, like the increasing “proliferation of 
26 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
Even if CSLI could pinpoint location down to the millimeter, the central 
premise of Carpenter remains: an individual volunteered that information to a 
business.101 It is simply address information the company uses to complete a 
communication. Thus, following the logic in Carpenter, protection even for the 
most precise locations will remain unprotected. However, this runs counter to 
one of the Sixth Circuit’s main arguments: CSLI does not reveal intimate details 
like GPS tracking does. These two competing rationales will eventually come 
to a head, and we do not know which will prevail.  
3. GPS Third Party Business Records 
Similar to the increasingly precise CSLI concern is the use of current GPS 
third party records. These are tools such as Google Maps102 or the GPS systems 
in cars. These types of tools use GPS data to provide directions for users going 
from point A to point B. It is important to note—third parties provide these tools 
only to users who volunteer their location information by inputting information 
to use the service.  
The location information held by these companies runs into the same 
problem as more specific CSLI: the information is very revealing, but it is still 
a business record. Therefore, will courts focus on the specificity of information 
and protect this location information by treating it like a GPS tracking case? Or, 
will courts place more emphasis on the voluntary disclosure of information to a 
third party, and treat this like a CSLI case that loses any expectation of privacy?  
We are unsure how courts will handle this moving forward. However, 
following the rationale of Carpenter, this information is a business record and 
will be subject to the address/content distinction.  
Assuming courts use the address/content distinction in this scenario, another 
problem arises: with these types of services, the address information is the 
content information. The location of the user is the information needed to 
complete the service (i.e., the phone numbers revealed in Smith, or the address 
in Ex Parte Jackson). However, a court could also consider that information the 
content of the service—the substance of the service is to provide geographic 
information to the user.  
                                                                                                                 
smaller and smaller [cell sites] such as microcells, picocells, and femtocells—which 
cover a very specific area” . . . . Rather, the majority concedes what follows unavoidably 
from its holding: “the applicability of the Fourth Amendment [does not] hinge[ ] on the 
precision of CSLI,” or on its quantity. 
Graham, 824 F.3d at 448 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(alterations in original except “[A]”) (citations omitted) (first quoting In re Application for 
Tel. Info. Needed for a Criminal Investigation, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1023 (N.D. Cal. 2015); 
and then quoting Graham, 824 F.3d at 426 n.3 (majority opinion)). 
 101 See United States v. Carpenter, 819 F.3d 880, 888 (6th Cir. 2016).  
 102 Google Maps is a smartphone application that provides users with driving, walking, 
or transit directions. See About, GOOGLE MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y3WZ-6AC4].  
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After Carpenter, we do not know how courts will treat this information. 
Will they protect the information because it is extremely specific and revealing? 
Will they not protect the information because it was voluntarily provided to a 
business? Will they use the address/content distinction, and if they do, is the 
data classified as address or as content information? The framework the Sixth 
Circuit adopts in Carpenter leaves all these questions unanswered.  
4. Mass Amounts of Information 
Last but not least, the Sixth Circuit (nor the other circuits) did not limit how 
much CSLI the government can obtain. In Carpenter, the FBI collected 127 
days’ worth of CSLI.103 However, under the current framework, what stops the 
FBI from collecting more?  
If location information loses Fourth Amendment protection because it is a 
business record, nothing stops the FBI from collecting as much CSLI as the third 
party has on record.104 This could lead to the FBI requesting six months, two 
years, or even decades’ worth of location information.105 It is hard to imagine 
an America where the government can access a decade’s worth of location 
information without a search warrant. However, that is exactly the door that 
Carpenter opens.106 
C. The Supreme Court’s Opportunity to Protect Privacy 
With all these questions in mind, the Supreme Court now has the 
opportunity to review Carpenter, and more importantly, the role of the Fourth 
Amendment in the digital world. The Supreme Court should not sidestep this 
opportunity.107 
                                                                                                                 
 103 Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 886. 127 days can provide an absurd amount of geographic 
data points. In another case, sixty-seven days provided over 11,000 data points. See supra 
note 92.  
 104 See Carpenter, 819 F.3d at 896 (Stranch, J., concurring in part) (“I am also concerned 
about the applicability of a test that appears to admit to no limitation on the quantity of 
records or the length of time for which such records may be compelled.”). 
 105 These long time frames are unlikely because the SCA requires this type of 
information to be connected to a reasonable belief of criminal activity. See United States v. 
Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 344 (4th Cir. 2015), adhered to in part en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th 
Cir. 2016). It is hard to believe a court would grant permission for the government to obtain 
information for that long of a time period. However, imagine a drug ring or financial crime 
that has occurred over a lengthy period of time. Nothing will stop the government from 
accessing these individuals’ location information for the entire time period.  
 106 One solution to this problem is the adoption of the mosaic theory. For a discussion 
of the mosaic theory, see generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). To see how courts could use the mosaic theory 
in conjunction with the third party doctrine, see Stevenson, supra note 9, at 161–63. 
 107 The Supreme Court already passed on the opportunity once when it denied certiorari 
for the Davis case. Davis v. United States, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog 
.com/case-files/cases/davis-v-united-states-2/ [https://perma.cc/XH96-VD5W].  
28 UNITED STATES v. CARPENTER [2017 
If the Supreme Court reviews Carpenter and upholds the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision, the Supreme Court will still provide necessary guidance to lower 
courts dealing with CSLI issues. The Court will either agree with the growing 
consensus on CSLI, or it will instruct the lower courts to analyze CSLI 
differently (such as a location tracking analysis). However, it may be more 
prudent for the Supreme Court to review Carpenter and use the platform to offer 
its vision for the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Because of rapidly changing technology, the time is ripe for a new approach 
to Fourth Amendment cases. The Supreme Court could begin those changes 
with a review of Carpenter.  
With a review of Carpenter, the Court could do many things. First, the Court 
could take a traditional stance on the third party doctrine and reinforce that even 
during the digital age, anything provided to a third party is not protected. 
Second, the Court could abandon the third party doctrine, because it is not 
suitable for the twenty-first century. Third, the Supreme Court could adopt a 
compromise approach that preserves the third party doctrine, but also recognizes 
privacy for the digital world in which we live.108 Fourth, the Court could more 
clearly articulate the standard for when a location based analysis applies and 
when a business records, address/content distinction analysis applies.  
This list is by no means exhaustive; the avenues available for the Court to 
update the Fourth Amendment are almost limitless.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
After United States v. Carpenter, only one thing is clear: cell phone users 
in the Sixth Circuit do not have Fourth Amendment protection over their CSLI. 
The Sixth Circuit issued a sound—albeit safe—opinion applying traditional 
Fourth Amendment principles to new technology. Unfortunately, applying 
traditional principles leaves many questions unanswered. More importantly, 
applying these traditional principles may also diminish the privacy individuals 
should enjoy in the future.109 
The action now moves to the Supreme Court, which has the opportunity to 
review Carpenter. If the Supreme Court reviews the case, it can examine the 
Fourth Amendment and determine how it will operate in the twenty-first 
century. Or, the Supreme Court can choose to not review the case, and continue 
to ignore the almost guaranteed privacy issues that will only worsen if 
traditional thinking is applied to untraditional technology. 
                                                                                                                 
 108 For one example of how the Supreme Court can attempt to strike this balance, see 
generally Stevenson, supra note 9.  
 109 Discussing the Fourth Circuit’s application of traditional principles from Miller and 
Smith, a dissenting judge stated: “In other words, the majority’s expansive interpretation of 
Miller and Smith will, with time, gather momentum—with effects increasingly destructive 
of privacy.” United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 446 n.8 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Wynn, 
J., dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment). 
